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THE LONG ARM SHRINKS:

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

PROBLEM OF THE NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT
IN WORLD- WIDE VOLKSWAGEN
CORP. V WOODSON
INTRODUCTION

In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,' the United States Supreme
Court attempted to unravel one of the knottiest paradoxes of long-arm jurisdiction: When may a state court constitutionally obtain jurisdiction over a
tortfeasor who at no time was physically present in that state, who had no
contacts with that state, but whose product caused injury there?
As Justice Goldberg stated in Rosenblatt v. Amerzcan Cyanamid Corp. ,2 the
cases questioning the application of long-arm statutes did so where "the foreign defendant was never physically present in the forum state, and the tortious act there was unintentional."' 3 Indeed, the issue was more than ripe for
resolution, or at least guidance, long before the highway disaster that precipitated the litigation in World-Wide. The nation's courts have been divided in
regard to the problem of the distant defendant whose contacts with the forum state amounted solely to the injury produced there by a product he sold
to the plaintiff.
This article will explore the positions taken by various courts prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in World-Wide. At the same time, this article
will attempt to assess the implications of a decision which may change the
face of jurisdiction in products liability actions.
I.

THE DECISION

In September 1977, Kay Robinson, an ex-New Jersey resident, was driving with her two children to their new home in Arizona. While traveling
through Oklahoma, the Robinsons' Audi was struck from behind by another
vehicle. The Audi's gasoline tank ruptured, and the resulting fire spread to
the passenger compartment, severely injuring Mrs. Robinson and the children.
The Robinsons brought suit in Oklahoma against the Audi's manufacturer, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft; the importer, Volkswagen of
America, Inc.; the regional distributor for Connecticut, New York, and New
Jersey, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation (World-Wide); and the retail
dealer, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway).
1. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). For a further discussion of the case, see Woods, Pennoyer's Dtmre."
PersonalJurisdicionAfter Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Predction Regarding World-Wide Volk-

swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARiZ. L. REV. 861, 907-13 (1978).
2. 86 S. Ct. I (stay denied) (Goldberg, J., in chambers), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 110

(1965).
3. Id at 4.
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The plaintiffs attempted to obtain Oklahoma jurisdiction over the defendants through two sections of the Oklahoma long-arm statute:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or claim for
relief arising from the person's:
(3) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission
in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission
outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state . .. .4
World-Wide and Seaway contended that the district court could not
obtain jurisdiction over them since they had no minimal contacts with the
State of Oklahoma. 5 Judge Woodson denied their motion to dismiss and the
6
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed his ruling.
Justice Barnes of the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that jurisdiction
over World-Wide and Seaway was justified on the basis of section
1701.03(a)(4) of the Oklahoma long-arm statute. 7 The trial court, he concluded, could infer that World-Wide and Seaway derived "substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in this state," 8 and hence, could be
subjected to Oklahoma jurisdiction. The rationale was that the defendants
could foresee the plaintiffs' Audi being driven in or through Oklahoma during the course of its mechanical life, and thus, because of the retail value of
the automobile, the defendants derived substantial revenue from cars used in
9
Oklahoma.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's ruling. Justice White, speaking for the Court, asserted that the record was devoid of "those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state court jurisdiction."' 0 The Supreme Court
decided, in effect, that basing jurisdiction on a single injury inflicted in the
forum state by a product sold elsewhere violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
II.

THE BACKGROUND OF WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. V

A.

International Shoe v. Washington

WOODSON

World-Wide represents another chapter of the minimum contacts saga
4. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(3), (4) (West 1980). A corporation is deemed to
be a person for the purposes of the Oklahoma long-arm statute. See id. § 1701.01.
5. 444 U.S. at 289.
6. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
7. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(3), (4) (West 1980).
8. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978).
9. Id at 354-55.
10. 444 U.S. at 295. The Court based its decision on the fact that the automobile accident
was the petitioner's sole contact with the State of Oklahoma. The petitioner had conducted no
sales, services, advertising, or other business activities in Oklahoma, nor had it availed itself of
the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. Id.
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that began with International Shoe v. Washington.II International Shoe intro-

duced the modern due process requirements in regard to obtaining jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, ifhe be not present within the territogy of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenanceof
the suit does not ofend traditionalnotions offair play and substantialjustice. 12

In recent years, the Supreme Court has vigorously opposed state court
attempts to restrict the application of the "minimum contacts" test.' 3 In
Shaffer v.Heitner, 14 where the principles of InternationalShoe were extended to
cover quasi in rem actions as well as those in personam, the Court flatly stated
that "[tihe standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over
the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the mini15
mum contacts standard elucidated in InternationalShoe."
The Supreme Court also has applied the requirement that there be a
sufficient connection between defendant and forum in cases involving domestic matters,' 6 in cases where jurisdiction is attempted through garnishment of a defendant's insurance policy, 17 and, finally, in World-Wide, in a
products liability action where the plaintiffs attempted to serve process on
the nonresident distributors and dealers as well as on the manufacturer and
importer.
B.

Products Liability Actions Before World-Wide

In Hanson v. Denckla, l a the Supreme Court cautioned that it is only by
the acts of the defendant-not the plaintiff-that minimum contacts are created between the defendant and the forum. In sustaining the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court stated that "it is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 9
Before the decision in World-Wide, there was controversy as to whether
the Hanson rule, as cited above, applied to products liability actions. If the
defendant's contacts with the forum state must be "purposeful," that is, intentionally initiated by the defendant himself, jurisdiction could not be
based on an injury in the forum state caused by a defective product brought
there by the plaintiff. For example, New York could not provide relief in its
11.326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. Id at 316 (emphasis added).
13. Se Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In one
instance, the Court did adopt a liberal interpretation of the minimum contacts doctrine. See
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
14. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
15. Id at 207.
16. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
17. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
18. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
19. Id at 253.
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courts to a resident poisoned by tainted food he bought in California and
consumed back in New York.
In Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court ,20 and in Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior
Court,2t the California Supreme Court applied the Hanson rule to products
liability actions (even though jurisdiction in Buckeye was sustained on other
grounds) .22 On the other hand, some courts have insisted that applying the
Hanson rule to products liability actions creates a mechanical test ofjurisdiction and violates the spirit of flexibility that characterized the pronouncements of InternationalShoe and its progeny. In Philbps v. Anchor Hocking Glass
Corp., 23 the Arizona Supreme Court disagreed with those states that interpreted the "purposeful activity" language of Hanson to refuse jurisdiction in
products liability cases over a defendant who could not foresee the presence
24
of his product within the forum.
The problem illustrated by Fisher, Buckeye, and Philips is that
bility of products within the vast reaches of the American economic
is such that a defective product may unleash its deadly qualities far
place of origin. Many dangerous items have a time bomb effect in
injuries they inflict do not erupt until long after their initial use.

the monetwork
from its
that the

Duignan v. A.H. Robins C0.25 is illustrative of this phenomenon. In that
case, the plaintiff was fitted with an intrauterine device in California. A
Virginia-based corporation manufactured the device. After the plaintiff
moved to Idaho, she contracted an infection, necessitating an operation to
remove a fallopian tube, as well as additional, exploratory surgery. The defendant contended that "[a] forum-shopping plaintiff with a 'portable tort'
should not be able to use Idaho's long-arm statute to sue a corporation
which lacks any other contact with the state." 26 The Idaho Supreme Court
rejected this argument and asserted that because we live in a mobile society,
a negligent party in a products liability action must be prepared to defend
20. 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959).
21. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
22. In Buckeye, the court commented:
Courts and commentators have expressed differing views on whether the statement in Hanson v. Denckla, . . . that jurisdiction over an absent nonresident defendant
can only be predicated upon activity which the defendant "purposefully" conducts
within the forum state, applies in all cases, including products liability actions against nonresident manufacturers, or islimited to cases factually similar to Hanson . . . . This court has
apparently taken the former and sounder position, that the Hanson formulation of the
"minimum contacts" test . . . is generally applicable.
71 Cal. 2d at 897, 458 P.2d at 63, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 119 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
23. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
24. Some state courts have been inconsistent in setting forth what constitutes sufficient
contacts between a defendant and the forum state. Compare Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court,
180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973) with Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177
Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972), and Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d
647 (1967) with Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wash. 2d 469, 403
denied, 382 U.S. 1025 (1966).
P.2d 351 (1965), cert.
25. 98 Idaho 134, 559 P.2d 750 (1977). For an analysis of the constitutional problems
regarding products liability actions involving nonresident manufacturers, see Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Products Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028
(1965).
26. 98 Idaho at 136, 559 P.2d at 752.
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itself "wherever injury should occur." '2 7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with this doctrine. In Duple
Motor Bodies, Lid v. Holingsworth ,28 itreaffirmed the jurisdiction of the district court for the district of Hawaii over an English corporation that manufactured coach bodies for an English vehicle manufacturer. The vehicle
manufacturer then shipped the finished coaches to Hawaii, where the plaintiffs' injuries occurred.
The appellate court justified jurisdiction over the coach manufacturer
on the ground that even though the defendant itself did not ship the vehicles
to Hawaii, "[tihe bodies were designed and manufactured . . . with the
knowledge that they were to be used in Hawaii and were made with special
modifications to adapt them for use there."' 29 Circuit Judge Ely vigorously
dissented on the basis of the Hanson rule. He attacked "[t]he extension of
30
Hawaii's 'long-arm' statute so that it stretches halfway around the world"
in situations where the defendant did not "purposely avail himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, '' 1 as required by
Hanson.
The question remained, however, whether refusing to apply the Hanson
rule to products liability actions offended the "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" 32 extolled in International Shoe. Certainly, there is a
limit beyond which it is unfair to force a manufacturer or dealer corporation
to defend itself in a state to which it did not ship the product in question,
and with which it had no contacts except for the injury caused by that product.
In World-Wide, the United States Supreme Court expressed concern
that state courts were zealously overreaching the limits imposed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment in their efforts to catch elusive
manufacturers and dealers whose products injured residents or guests. 33 By
applying the Hanson rule to products liability actions, the Supreme Court, in
World-Wide, restrained this state court tendency. The Court ruled that a
corporation which purposefully conducts activities within a state is deemed
to have had "clear notice that it is subject to suit there."' 34 Also, a corporation delivering products into the stream of commerce "with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state" 35 may be sub27. Id at 138, 559 P.2d at 754 (citing Dogett v. Electrics Corp., 93 Idaho 26, 31-32, 454
P.2d 63, 68 (1969)).
28. 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
29. Id at 234.
30. Id. at 236 (Ely, J., dissenting).
31. Id (Ely, J., dissenting).
32. 326 U.S. at 316.
33. The Court stated:
The concept of minimum contacts. . . can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system.
444 U.S. at 291-92.
34. Id at 297.
35. ld at 297-98.
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jected to a lawsuit in that state. In World-Wde, however, no such constitutional grounds existed to justify Oklahoma jurisdiction over World-Wide or
Seaway. 36 Thus, a state court may assume jurisdiction in a products liability
action only on the basis of the defendant's role in knowingly bringing, shipping, or selling a product to customers in that state.
The decision in World-Wide also expressly or implicitly dealt with various legal fictions that had been advanced by state and federal courts to justify jurisdiction in products liability actions where affiliations between the
defendant and the forum were absent. Several of these legal fictions are explored in the following pages.
III.

A.

JURISDICTION OVER THE DISTANT DEFENDANT

Foreseeabity

The Oklahoma Supreme Court in World- Wide attempted to justify jurisdiction over defendants World-Wide and Seaway on the basis that, since an
automobile is a mobile product, the defendants could "foresee its possible use
in Oklahoma" 3 7 and hence derived substantial revenue from cars that might
be driven or resold in that state.
Numerous cases have supported the proposition that foreseeability justifies the forum state's jurisdiction over the defendant. The rationale in those
cases is that if a manufacturer or dealer could anticipate a product's ending
up in a given state and injuring someone there, the manufacturer or dealer
has implicitly consented to service of process from that state.
Some courts, however, have displayed a tendency to employ the foreseeability test as a measure of last resort whenever other minimum contacts
standards fail to uphold the exercise of jurisdiction. In Eerley Aircraft Co. v.
i'illian,38 the plaintiff's daughter was injured in Texas by a fall from an
amusement park ride manufactured by Eyerley Aircraft, an Oregon corporation. Eyerley Aircraft had sold the ride twenty years before to a traveling
amusement company in Chicago. The amusement company in turn resold
the ride in North Dakota to a second traveling amusement company.
Eyerley Aircraft had had no contact with the ride since introducing it into
interstate commerce by selling it to the Chicago amusement show. 3 9 There
were some unrelated business contacts between the defendant and the forum. The court, however, which could not base jurisdiction merely upon the
existence of unrelated business transactions, 40 emphasized foreseeability in
upholding in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. Eyerley Aircraft, the
court explained, knew that its products were itinerant in nature and "would
'4 1
not come to a permanent rest at the domicile of its original purchaser.
36. Id. at 298.
37. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978).
38. 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
39. Id at 595.
40. The court in Eerley Aircrafi determined that the defendant's business contacts with
Texas were not sufficient to sustain Texas jurisdiction over the matter. Had the ride that caused
the injury been shipped into Texas, after having been sold and serviced elsewhere many years
before, due process requirements would have been satisfied. Id
41. Id. at 597.
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Since Eyerley Aircraft could anticipate that the stream of commerce would
carry its products to Texas, the contacts between the corporation and Texas
42
were sufficient to justify Texas jurisdiction over Eyerley.
In Metal-Matic, Inc. v. District Court ,4 3 the court, unlike the court in
Eyerley Aircrafl, was more direct in that it did not painstakingly examine the
sufficiency of the commercial affiliations between the defendant and the forum state. The case involved a boat whose railing, manufactured by the
defendant in Minnesota, collapsed, causing the plaintiffs decedent to drown
in Lake Mead, Nevada. The court decided that a manufacturer of boat
parts reasonably could foresee its products finding markets "where navigable
lakes or waters are located, "' 44 and thus upheld jurisdiction.
In Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac,45 as in World- Wide, the trial court upheld
jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile dealer who had had no contacts
with the forum state except for the injury caused by a product the dealer
sold. As the Oklahoma court in World-Wide attempted to do, the court in
Reilly justified the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of foreseeability:
[T]he Court feels it is not unreasonable to assume Tolkan should
have anticipated that the Pontiac it sold to plaintiff and the jack
within it [which caused the injury] would come to be used in other
States . . . .Tolkan knew that it was selling a product that is distributed, and for which spare parts are available, throughout the
nation . . . .Thus, Tolkan should be prepared to defend on alleged defects in the product it sold which had consequences in New
46
Jersey.
Some of the courts that have attacked the foreseeability test have done
so on the basis of the problem pinpointed in Judge Sobeloff's illustration in
47
Ehrlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills:
[L]et us consider the hesitancy a California dealer might feel if
asked to sell a set of tires to a tourist with Pennsylvania license
plates, knowing he might be required to defend in the courts of
Pennsylvania a suit for refund of the purchase price or for heavy
damages in case of accident attributed to a defect in the tires ....
It is difficult to conceive of a more serious threat and deterrent to
the free flow of commerce between the states. 48
42. Id.

43. 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966).
44. Id. at 266, 415 P.2d at 619.
45. 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.NJ. 1974).
46. Id. at 1207. Other opinions considering the foreseeability factor in upholding jurisdiction include Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1972); Deveny v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100
Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966); Cole v. Doe, 77 Mich. App. 138, 258 N.W.2d 165 (1977); Roche
v. Floral Rental Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 555, 232 A.2d 162 (1967), aj'dmem., 51 N.J. 26, 237 A.2d
265 (1968); Gonzalez v. Harris Calorific Co., 64 Misc. 2d 287, 315 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct.), af'd
mner., 38 A.D.2d 720, 315 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1970); Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88
Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764 (1977).
47. 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
48. Id at 507. Variations of this hypothetical appear in Uppgren v. Executive Aviation
Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165 (D. Minn. 1969), and Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp.,
200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128 (1968). For other cases criticizing foreseeability as a test ofjurisdiction, see Kerrigan v. Clarke Gravely Corp., 71 F.R.D. 480 (M.D. Penn. 1975); Hapner v. Rolf
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The United States Supreme Court, in World-Wide, endorsed the hypothetical in Ehrlanger, and commented that if foreseeability were a deciding
factor in products liability actions, "[e]very seller of chattels would in effect
appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit
would travel with the chattel."149 Yet the Court did not completely dismiss
foreseeability as a criterion:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is
not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the
forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and conthat he should reasonably
nection with the forum State are such 50
anticipate being haled into court there.
Thus, in light of World-Wide, foreseeability may not be used as a substitute for the requirement of "purposeful" minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. Transient though a product may be, it is the
conduct of the defendant-not of the plaintiff or the product-that creates
the necessary affiliating circumstances upon which jurisdiction is based.
B.

Gray and the Defition of "Tortious Conduct"

Gray v. American Radiator & Standard San'tar, Corp.51 is cited often to support the proposition that, for statutory purposes, a "tortious act" is committed in the forum state if the injury occurred there. The court in Gray relied
upon the legal maxim that "the place of a wrong is where the last event takes
place which is necessary to render the actor liable." ' 52 Logically, the injury is
the last event needed to render the defendant liable; and if the injury occurred in the forum state, the tortious act was committed there.
By this circuitous reasoning, the court in Gray decided that the defendant-who manufactured a defective valve in Ohio that was installed in a hot
water heater in Pennsylvania, after which the hot water heater was sold to
the plaintiff in Illinois--committed a tortious act in Illinois, and hence was
subject to Illinois jurisdiction. A number of courts have adopted this approach to jurisdiction in products liability actions. 53 On the other hand,
many forums have rejected the tendency to equate "tortious act" with "injury." The court in Oliver v. American Motors Corp.54 maintained that the Restatement's definitions of "tortious conduct" and "place of wrong" adopted
in Gray are "given strictly within the framework of the subjects to which they
relate. To apply them uncritically to problems which relate to in personam
Brauchli, Inc., 404 Mich. 160, 273 N.W.2d 822 (1978); Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704
(Utah 1974).
49. 444 U.S. at 296.
50. Id. at 297.

51.

22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).

52. Id at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63 (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 377
(1934)).
53. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876, 878 (D. Minn.
1960); Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 578-81, 104 N.W.2d 888, 892-94
(1960); Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wash. 2d 469, 472, 403 P.2d

351, 354 (1965).
54. 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967).
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jurisdiction is to apply them out of [the] context" 5 5 in which they were defined in the Restatement of Torts 56 and the Restatement of Conflict of
57
Laws.
An even more curious definition associates "tortious conduct" with "doing business in the forum state." Yet many courts have justified the exercise
ofjurisdiction through interpretations which state that it is not a violation of
due process to find that if a foreign corporation commits a tort within the
state, it shall be deemed to be doing business in that state and will thereby
have designated the secretary of state as its agent for service of process in
58
that state.
In World-Wide, the United States Supreme Court did not explore the
issue of what constitutes a tortious act (for jurisdictional purposes) in products liability actions. Nor did it need to, for the Oklahoma Supreme Court
rejected the Gray principle in regard to the Oklahoma long-arm statute, because the statute itself precluded the adoption of such a definition and required additional contacts with Oklahoma if the tortfeasor caused an injury
there "by an act or omission outside" the state. 59
In World-Wide, the United States Supreme Court did not comment on
the semantic gymnastics of state courts in search of a jurisdictional basis.
Because of the World-Wide decision, however, the minimum contacts standards of InternationalShoe and Hanson, as applied to products liability actions,
may have been reinforced to withstand future attempts to circumvent these
standards through unconventional definitions of legal terms.
C.

The Stream of Commerce and the Forum State's Benevolence

Some courts have insisted that a company introducing products into the
"stream of commerce" automatically incurs liability wherever a defective
product injures someone. Anderson v. National Presto Industries, Inc. 60 is representative of this trend:
It would be flying in the face of reality if we did not admit knowledge that manufactured products are ordinarily designed for commercial sale in whatever markets may be found for them, without
regard to state lines. They are placedin the stream of commerce,-and when
they reach a foreign state they have the protection of its laws. It is not
unfair to say they should assume the burdens as well as the benefits
. . . and the producer of such products who sends them into anotherstate may
55. Id at 884, 425 P.2d at 653.
56.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6 (1957).

57.

RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). Other opinions criticizing the

Gray definition of tortious conduct include Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D.
Colo. 1966); Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1, 3 (M.D.N.C. 1960); LonginesWitmauer v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 21 A.D.2d 474, 251 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1964), alfd, 15 N.Y.2d
443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. dentid, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
58. Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 577, 104 N.W.2d 888, 892
(1960). See also Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963); Anderson v.
National Presto Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 913, 135 N.W.2d 639, 640 (1965); Smyth v. Twin
State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1193 (1952).
59. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 353-54 (Okla. 1978).
:'60. 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965).
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61

According to this trend of thought, manufacturers and dealers who send
their products into interstate channels should answer to the courts wherever
the products cause injury for two reasons: the forum states protect out-ofstate sellers through various laws and benefits,6 2 and these states have a
"manifest state interest" in seeing that their residents obtain relief from non63
resident tortfeasors.
The United States Supreme Court has endorsed this analysis. International Shoe and Hanson established the jurisdictional requirement that the
defendant must initiate the contacts with the forum state "thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." 64 And in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co. ,65 the Court acknowledged the "manifest interest" a state has "in
,,6
providing effective means of redress for its residents ....
In World-Wide, the United States Supreme Court cited Gray in affirming
that a corporation delivering its products "into the stream of commerce with
the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State" 6 7 constitutionally may be subjected to jurisdiction there.68 A mere
likelihood of sale in the forum state, however, is not enough; the defendant
must have real, substantial connections with the state in order to be answerable to its courts. World-Wide and Seaway might have anticipated that the
cars they sold would be used in Oklahoma, but since the area in which they
operated was restricted and distant from the situs of injury, they were not
subject to the reach of Oklahoma's courts.
D.

The Convenient Forum
For a few courts, jurisdiction is justified by convenience. In Gray, the

61. Id. at 919, 135 N.W.2d at 643 (emphasis added). See also Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584
F.2d 833, 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978); Eyerley Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414
F.2d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1969); Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205, 1206
(D.NJ. 1974); McCoy v. Wean United, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 491, 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 899, 458 P.2d 57, 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (1969);
Duignan v. A.H. Robins Co., 98 Idaho 134, 138, 559 P.2d 750, 754 (1977); Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961); Hapner v.
Rolf Brauchli, Inc., 404 Mich. 160, 177, 273 N.W.2d 822, 824 (1978).
62. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 442,
176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961); Anderson v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 919, 135
N.W.2d 639, 643 (1965).
63. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 898, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1969).
64. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
65. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
66. Id. at 223. Some courts have been quick to find a "manifest state interest" in products
liability actions against nonresidents:
A state has a legitimate interest in providing a meaningful forum for its citizens who
have suffered damages as a result of faulty products being shipped into the state by
foreign corporations.
Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833, 839 (8th Cir. 1978). See also Fields v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 53 (Okla. 1976); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460, 463 (Okla.
1970); Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 Wash. 2d 50, 57, 558 P.2d 764, 768
(1977).
67. 444 U.S. at 297-98.
68. Id.
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court stated that "[t]he principles of due process relevant to the issue in this
case support jurisdiction in the court where both parties can most conveniently settle their dispute."' 69 As in World- Wide, the injury in Gray occurred
in the forum state, the witnesses resided there, and the evidence as to damages and other elements of the action originated there. Yet, the United
States Supreme Court in World- Wide did not accord consideration to convenience as a factor in long-arm jurisdiction, except to state that minimum contacts, as required by the due process clause, serve in part to protect the
70
defendant against inconvenient litigation.
Convenience, then, may be an element of minimum contacts, to be
weighed along with other factors in deciding the question of whether jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant, but it is no more than that. As
pointed out in Pellegr'niv. Sachs &Sons, 7 1 the problem with applying convenience as a test of jurisdiction is that convenience is a two-way street. 7 2 One
generally cannot render a situation convenient for one party without inconveniencing the other.
E.

The Wave of the Future

The United States Supreme Court in World-Wide once more acknowledged the economic and technological trends that increased the volume of
commerce among the several states and led to the problems of multi-state
litigation.7 3 The Court, however, firmly maintained that it could not accept
"the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes,"
while remaining "faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied
74
in the Constitution.
Many state courts, however, did not feel that a conflict existed between
liberalizing long-arm jurisdiction in response to changing conditions, and
conforming to the federalist principles of the Constitution. The Gray decision reflected an optimism shared by numerous courts in regard to the jurisdictional implications of modernity:
Advanced means of distribution and other commercial activity
have made possible these modern methods of doing business, and
have largely effaced the economic signifwance of State hnes. By the same
token, today's facilities for transportation and communication have
enremoved much of the difficulty and inconvenience formerly
5
countered in defending lawsuits brought in other States.
The state courts, by and large, have not exhibited a desire to restrain
their sovereignty in accordance with the spirit of federalism. The Supreme
Court in World-Wide may have borne this in mind as it restated the words of
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
modern

22 Il. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
444 U.S. at 294.
522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974).
Id at 707.
444 U.S. at 292-93.
Id at 293.
22 Ill.
2d at 442-43, 176 N.E.2d at 766 (emphasis added). Several courts believed that
conditions called for the further liberalization of jurisdictional requirements. See, e.g.,

Anderson v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 917, 135 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1965);

Hapner v. Rolf Brauchli, Inc., 404 Mich. 160, 177, 273 N.W.2d 822, 827 (1978) (Moody, J.).
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Hanson to the effect that restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts are "a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the re' 76
spective States."
CONCLUSION

World-Wide is not a closed chapter in the history of in personam jurisdiction. This decision establishes that purposeful minimum contacts are required to sustain jurisdiction in products liability actions. Additional
questions, however,--some of which are raised in the dissents of Justices
Marshall and Blackmun-remain unresolved. The most important of these
questions is whether local dealers and retailers are on the same jurisdictional
footing as manufacturers.
Justice Marshall, in dissent, maintained that since automobile distributors serve a multistate market and local dealers participate in a nationwide
network of dealerships, they "can fairly expect that the cars they sell may
cause injury in distant States and that they may be called on to defend a
resulting lawsuit there." 7 7 Justice Blackmun concurred:
It therefore seems to me not unreasonable-and certainly not unconstitutional. . . to uphold Oklahoma jurisdiction over this New
York distributor and . . . dealer when the accident happened in
Oklahoma. I see nothing more unfair for them than for the manufacturer and the importer. All are in the business of providing ve78
hicles that spread out over the highways of our several States.
In the future, courts-perhaps even the United States Supreme Courtmay determine whether a defendant's status as a manufacturer or as a dealer
ought to influence the extent to which it is subject to long-arm jurisdiction.
Only then will the ruling of World- Wide be utilized with confidence to solve
the problem of the nonresident, nonaffiliated defendant in products liability
actions.
In addition to the question of whether manufacturers ought to be protected by the same jurisdictional barriers as dealers are, the decision in
World-Wide presented a plaintiff's quandary: Where might a claim for relief
be heard if the state in which the injury occurred cannot compel the
tortfeasor's presence because the requisite affiliations between the two are
lacking?
The plaintiff who chooses the state of his residence as the forum still
faces the same problem that the petitioner in World-Wide faced. Sufficient
minimum contacts must exist to enable any state to exercise jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant.
On the other hand, the states in which the defendants reside may be
76. 444 U.S. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)).
77. 444 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Several courts have decided that nonresident

retailers should not be subjected to the same jurisdictional tests as manufacturers are. See, e.g.,
Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Minn. 1969); Tilley v.
Keller Truck & Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 648-49, 438 P.2d 128, 134 (1968); Pellegrini v.
Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1974); Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d
875, 889-90, 425 P.2d 653, 656 (1967).
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unsuitable forums also. A plaintiff suing several defendants could be compelled, at great expense, to file multiple lawsuits in various states in order to
obtain complete relief. Each suit risks being dismissed for want of an indispensable party. Furthermore, it often is impossible or prohibitively expensive to transport witnesses and other evidence from the situs of the injury to a
distant forum.
A plaintiff in a products liability action may be able to obtain relief in a
federal district court, under limited circumstances. The amount of damages
to which the plaintiff is entitled must exceed $10,000; also, there must be
complete diversity of state citizenship between the parties79 or else the matter in controversy must arise "under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States." 80 Not every plaintiff is fortunate in having none of the defendants residing in his home state, or in having a lawsuit which incorporates a "federal question," thereby enabling him to sue in a federal court.
In protecting defendants from distant and inconvenient litigation, the
Supreme Court, by its decision in World- Wide, has restricted the plaintiff's
forum alternatives. As a result, the scales of justice may shift in favor of the
due process rights of corporate defendants and against the injured parties'
right to compensation.

Susan R. Harris

79. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
80. Id § 1331.

